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Abstract: Part of the difficulty in public sector labour relations is the apparently inevitable 
confrontation between government and civil service unions. This idea is sketched out here 
with particular attention to the inherently political nature of public sector education in England 
and Canada. Of the many characteristics of public sector labour relations, governments’ dual 
role as employer and legislator remains the most distinctive. It provides an advantage which 
governing parties in both jurisdictions have used to their singular benefit. This power is also 
the source of limitations within the public sector labour relations framework. With little 
recourse via the law (grievances, legislation), teachers’ unions have taken their message to the 
public in an attempt to improve their leverage in negotiations with government. Developing in 
the late 20th century, public campaigns have been a favoured means for highlighting issues 
which fit under the broad catchphrase of protecting quality in public education. Conversely, 
government may also implement its own rebuttal campaign based on the need for financial 
restraint. As part of this contest, both sides invoke the threat of public outcry as a force which 
each claims it may muster, for the purpose of maximising its bargaining position. This is the 
framework of contemporary public sector education collective negotiations. In effect, modern 
day public sector education bargaining has become the means of retrenchment: government, in 
a centralised funding arrangement such as that in England and Ontario, allocates money and 
dictates the terms of employment.  
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 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, the labour relations framework for government and teachers’ unions 
is sketched. Governments’ dual role as legislator and employer (or at least funder) 
has highlighted the limitations of the public sector framework, thereby 
necessitating a different approach by teachers’ unions. Campaigns have now 
become the normal means of representing teachers. The presumption that 
government works exclusively in favour of the public is challenged as it relates to 
education. Instead, it acts as a political party seeking to maintain its status as the 
governing party.1 And so, public sector education labour relations are carried out 
in a manner which puts the public at the centre as the two sides vie for its support.  
The interaction between government and teachers has traditionally occurred 
in the course of collective bargaining or, as has arisen more recently, some form of 
collective negotiation. The floor in these negotiations had been focused more on 
the financial cost. As governments approached the 21st century the floor was 
renovated to include schooling standards, with a similar focus on what work 
teachers performed. Emphases in collective negotiation began to reflect this move. 
It would hardly be hyperbolic to call the changes during the years leading to and 
immediately after the turn of the 21st century monumental.  
In the first section, public and private sector labour relations are 
distinguished. The difference can be traced to the government’s role as legislator 
and employer. The curiosity of education is that there is a private sector industry 
(in the form of independent schools), but it has not threatened to overtake its 
public sector counterpart. Recent proposals from the Coalition Government in 
2010 have created a possibility that this might change. 
The second section introduces the two jurisdictions under study. It provides 
an historical overview of events as they pertain to education reforms with an 
emphasis on events from the 1970s to the present day. Historically there is 
alignment in the course of events (though temporally the similar events occur 
about fifteen years apart). In each jurisdiction a Conservative Government comes 
to power after a ‘left-leaning’ government has been defeated. Once in office, the 
new governments radically reform education and centralise control in its hands. 
Unsurprisingly, labour relations unrest ensues, and there is a period of significant 
conflict between teachers and government. After about a decade of this labour 
turmoil new ‘liberal’ governments are elected to office. Their own plans for 
education reform are initiated. Hope for renewed labour relations accompanies 
these governments coming to power.   
For this paper, the importance of reform efforts and teachers’ work forms the 
emphasis. A government’s education reform agenda necessarily affects teachers’ 
                                                     
1 The point may be made of the other government portfolios.  
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work.2 More recently, the impetus for improvements in the quality of education 
has been globalisation and its implications. Creating a more adept self-standing 
education system places greater emphasis on the role of individual teachers.3 It is a 
simple equation in the education sector: ‘the success or failure of any scheme of 
educational reform depends upon the teachers’.4 A research report on the reasons 
for high performing school systems identified three factors, all relating to teaching 
personnel: having the right people become teachers; developing these individuals  
into effective instructors; and putting in place ‘systems and targeted support to 
ensure that every child is able to benefit from excellent instruction’.5 The 
importance of the labour force, specifically teachers, is unequivocal,6 primarily 
because they are ‘inextricably linked to the integrity of the school system’.7  
In the final section, the argument is put forward that government’s actions 
have become somewhat sacred in public sector education labour relations; that is, 
government retains a certain leeway with the public to make significant changes to 
education, and the presumption is that these changes are for the better. Consider 
the long-held assertion that government is the guardian of the public interest. The 
statement exposes a notionally antithetical commingling of the public benefit with 
politics. A modified perspective is endorsed. Instead of uncritically accepting 
government as working in the public interest when it comes to public sector 
education labour relations, the perspective put forward by the authors of Clash of 
Rights is advocated.8 Political parties are in the business of politics which means 
that their job is to form and remain as the government.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 ‘[…] the utilisation and cost of labour within a labour intensive service makes industrial relations a 
central concern’: M. Ironside and R. Seifert, Industrial Relations in Schools (London: Routledge, 1995), 3. 
The point is reiterated in the Government’s 2009 White Paper on education – ‘The ability of the school 
system to support every child and young person to achieve success depends most of all on the school 
workforce.’ Department for Children, Schools and Families, Your Child, Your Schools, Our Future: Building a 
21st Century School System (London: TSO, 2009), 85.  
3 ‘Creating a worldclass education service was never going to be easy but that is what the economy and 
society of the future require. A modern teaching profession is central to this process. If teachers rise to 
the challenge of modernisation in the next few months they themselves, along with pupils and parents, 
will undoubtedly be major beneficiaries.’ Department for Education and Employment, Teachers: Meeting the 
Challenge of Change, Cm 4164 (London: TSO, 1998) (bold in original). 
4 H.C. Dent, The Education Act, 1944: Provisions, Regulations, Circulars, Later Act (London: University of 
London Press Ltd, 12th ed, 1968), 25. 
5 McKinsey & Company, How the World’s Best-Performing School Systems Come Out on Top (McKinsey, 2007), 
13. 
6 Noted in a number of ways, most recently in the report of the Workforce Agreement Monitoring 
Group in the United Kingdom which wrote: ‘the school workforce is critical to raising standards’. 
Workforce Agreement Monitoring Group, ‘The National Agreement – Seven Years On’ (2010), at 
http:www.socialpartnership.org/upload/resources/pdf/w/wamg_7_years_on_english.pdf.  
7 Attis v New Brunswick School District No.15 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, at [43]. 
8 P. M. Sniderman, J. F. Fletcher, P. H. Russell, P. E. Tetlock, The Clash of Rights (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996). 
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DISTINGUISHING PUBLIC FROM PRIVATE SECTOR LABOUR 
RELATIONS 
 
Public sector labour is distinct from its private sector counterpart as ‘government 
is not just another industry’.9 This section outlines, briefly, some of the 
distinctions for the purpose of better situating public sector labour relations.  
Distinct from the traditional employer, government possesses legislative 
powers which permit a far-reaching variety of actions.10 Government is 
democratically charged with making decisions on behalf of citizens.11 The measure 
of this power has often been called the public interest.12 Although one of the 
primary functions of any government, it is through the legislative authority that 
the government’s ‘agenda’ or overarching programme for managing its portfolios 
is given effect. The legitimacy of its conduct is drawn from the public or national 
interest,13 and its exercise of this power is fettered by constitutional limitations, 
more particularly democratic accountability.14 As a whole, the identity of 
government suggested by these characteristics is one of distinction.15 Government 
as employer stands out as a distinct member amongst labour law’s ‘employers’. 
The uniqueness of public sector labour relations lies with the employer and not 
the employees.16 Funded by taxes,17 Government provides services for residents. 
Selling no product, government’s work is, in education, a monopoly. These points 
support a characterisation of public sector labour relations as ‘permanent 
exceptionalism’.18 
                                                     
9 C.W. Summers, ‘Public Sector Bargaining: A Different Animal’ (2003) 5(3) University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Labor and Employment Law 441; ‘Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective’ (1974) 83 
Yale Law Journal 1156; H.W. Wellington and R.K. Winter, ‘The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public 
Employment’ (1969) 78 Yale Law Journal 1107, 1120-1121. 
10 H.W. Arthurs, ‘Public Interest Labor Disputes in Canada: A Legislative Perspective’ (1967) Buffalo Law 
Review 39, 39. A.C.L. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 4. 
11 G.W. Adams The Private and Public Sector Collective Bargaining Environments (Kingston: Industrial Relations 
Centre, Queen’s University, 1993), 10. 
12 G. Morris, ‘Employment in Public Services: The Case for Special Treatment’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 167, 174. 
13 ‘National interest’ is the term used by Fredman and Morris. I equate this with public interest so as to 
better encompass the structure of the English and Canadian (the latter being a federalist system): S. 
Fredman and G.S. Morris, The State as Employer: Labour Law in the Public Services (London: Mansell, 1989), 
6. 
14 Morris, ibid, 174. 
15 These characteristics as well as funding from taxation (already noted) and large bureaucracies constitute 
the five characteristics found in Morris, ibid, 6.  
16 C.W. Summers, ‘Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking’ (1975) 44 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 669, 670. There is debate on this point. The authors of one text claim 
there is no uniqueness to public sector labour relations: H. Collins, K.D. Ewing, and A. McColgan, 
Labour Law: Text and Materials (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2nd ed, 2005). 
17 Morris, n 13 above, 174. 
18 L. Panitch and D. Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms (Aurora: 
Garamond Press, 3rd ed, 2003), ch 3. Though the term is utilised to note government’s increasing 
intervention in all matters of labour law, the term is most apt in describing a theme throughout public 
sector labour relations.  
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In both jurisdictions, private or independent schools abound.19 The seemingly 
tacit endorsement of government regarding independent schools continues to 
form a point of contention for teachers in government-maintained schools. The 
quite pointed regulation of teachers in maintained schools as compared to the 
relative freedom of those occupying positions at independent schools does little to 
defuse the matter. Tacit or open endorsement reached a peak during periods of 
Conservative governance. Conceptually, independent schools act as the ideal 
competition for public sector schools. However, the concept often referred to is in 
fact the more constrained ideal of independent schools whose names readily come 
to mind like well-established brand names. These schools have many benefits that 
a long history provides to such institutions, including active and generous alumni, 
the ability to turn away students, and facilities which often surpass those available 
in government schools. The term ‘independent school’ is quite a bit larger in scope 
than these elite institutions.20 Independent schools include schools which are not 
so reputable. Relative to the layers of legislation found for government schools, 
independent schools are primarily governed by the Education (Independent 
School Standards) (England) Regulations 2003,21 and the Education Act, sections 
16-17, in Ontario. The standards set are relatively basic ones such as ensuring that 
students ‘acquire skills in speaking and listening, literacy and numeracy skills’.22 
Independent schools are also subject to inspection.23 
Competition between public and private schools is dissimilar to that found in 
other areas. First, there are a range of private institutions, but not all are of the 
calibre of the stereotypical schools with large campuses and high fees. Second, 
high fees have been a barrier to entry, and so public schools are not necessarily in 
danger of losing enough students to greatly diminish their numbers. While Ontario 
does have a private school system, the situation in England has become rather 
different in England recently. In the 2010 election, the Coalition Government 
announced a plan for greater local control over schools. Schools which have been 
rated as outstanding may be fast-tracked to academy status by the autumn of 2010. 
Part of the incentive is greater control over the work of the school. For example, 
academies have greater freedom over teachers’ pay and can deviate from the 
national curriculum. The other initiative, free schools, permits any group to 
establish and operate a school, funded by government money but free from its 
control. This means that the parents of a local school (for example) may decide to 
take control of that school and would be able to do so. As it is early days, the 
details have yet to be worked out. It would appear though that public money 
                                                     
19 ‘Public school’ has been used in England to refer to schools which are independently operated. The 
phrase ‘private school’ will be used to underline the distinction in these schools from those which are 
publicly-funded. 
20 As demonstrated by the breadth of the definition of ‘independent school’ found in s463 of the 
Education Act 1996, c.56. A similarly broad definition is found in Ontario in s1 of the Education Act 
R.S.O. 1990, c.E.2. 
21 No. 1910. 
22 ibid, s1(2)(c). 
23 ibid, s6. 
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would still be used in these schools. So these would not be private schools entirely, 
though they would be privately administered. Compared to the private school 
system, academies and free schools may pose a significant threat to the stability of 
public sector education. The threat may be attenuated once local groups come to 
understand what is involved in governing a school. As well, the plan presents 
options for those parents who currently have children in schools, a form of 
governing parent council. Neither free schools nor academies have a long-term 
focus as to who would be governing the school. And so, as parents’ children 
graduate from one school to another, there is potential for turnover in 
administration and thus a different form of instability. Chapter Five contains a 
critical elaboration of free schools and academies.  
Returning to the traditional form of public / private sector divide, the private 
sector is more singularly focused. At its base, the virtually exclusive aim of profit-
making points to the emphasis which the private sector places on economic 
concerns.24 Private sector entities strive to satisfy customers insofar as that 
pertains to profits. There is no inclination towards the welfare of the public.25 
Market incentives carry great potency so that labour relations impasses often find 
resolution in mediating the economic factors which dominate.26 Furthermore, 
collective bargaining tends to be quite different. While public sector employer 
negotiators often only represent others who are not at the table,27 private sector 
negotiators do not necessarily need an agreement to be ratified by shareholders.28 
Although market forces shape private sector bargaining, the public sector contains 
‘a process of governmental decisionmaking shaped ultimately by political forces. 
The introduction of collective bargaining in the private sector restructures the 
labor market, while in the public sector it also restructures the political 
processes’.29 
Underscoring the difference between the two areas, four characteristics of 
public sector employment may be identified.30 First, decisions as to the terms and 
conditions of employment are made by the government. Market forces can 
influence these decisions, but such pressure is filtered through the political 
process. It is contestable whether this remains accurate. Globalisation (whether it 
is itself a market force or it compels market forces to act) has brought political 
considerations closer to market pressures so that services like education have 
become more results-oriented, where results means meeting market demand. 
                                                     
24 J. Makinson (Chair), Incentives for Change: Rewarding Change in National Government Networks (Public 
Services Productivity Panel, 2000), 5. 
25 Summers, ‘Public Sector Bargaining’, n 9 above, 442. 
26 Adams, n 11 above, 12. 
27 This is often called the ‘ghost at the bargaining table problem’ as it was put in O.E.C.T.A. v Brant 
Haldimand-Norfolk Catholic District School Board, [2001] O.L.R.B. Rep. 292. The procedural justification is 
that expenditures are approved at the legislative level: Summers, ‘Public Sector Bargaining’, n 9 above, 
443. 
28 Summers, ibid. 
29 Summers, ‘Public Employee Bargaining’, n 9 above, 1156. 
30 ibid, 1159-1160. 
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Second, the employer is ultimately the public – ‘the voters to whom the public 
officials are responsible’.31 Summers astutely parses the public into two 
‘overlapping groups whose interests differ: first, those who use the employees’ 
services and, second, those who pay for those services through taxes’.32 The 
essence of these groups arises within the context of simple economics: ‘they want 
to maximize services and minimize costs’.33 Third, there is an imbalance in 
support: those who are concerned with the economic interests at stake (ie 
increased taxes through increased pay for public sector employees) outnumber 
those who share employees’ interests. Public sector workers, so Summers argued, 
are at a ‘significant disadvantage when their terms and conditions of employment 
are decided through a process responsive to majority will’.34 Pressure may be 
exerted by public employees in the public forum as this is a right which they have 
as citizens – though a unique right.35 As governments have become preoccupied 
with expenditure, service delivery and global competitiveness, public pressure has 
become an increasingly utilised tool although this carried with it risks – an idea 
elaborated upon in the next section.  
 
 
 
THE CURRENT PUBLIC SECTOR EDUCATION LABOUR 
RELATIONS FRAMEWORKS IN ENGLAND AND ONTARIO36 
 
ENGLAND 
 
The story of English Governments’ management of school teachers has been 
about as diverse as one may imagine. Since the 1970s, the metaphorical pendulum 
has swung widely in all sorts of different directions. Presently, a more prescriptive 
manner of regulation dominates. Managerialism of this form suggests a lack of 
trust in teachers’ work.  
The post-war era of English education governance was one of state non-
intervention. Schools and teachers managed most matters, such as curriculum.37 
Teachers at this time shied away from significant definition of their duties.38 Their 
casualness towards their contracts spoke of a period in which duties were finite. 
                                                     
31 ibid, 1159. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid, 1159-1160. 
35 ibid, 1160. 
36 As a form of comparative reference, the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) found Canada in top 10 (at number 5), while England was identified as a system with promise of 
strong improvement: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, at 
http://www.pisa.oecd.org/document/50/0,3343,en_32252351_32236173_37627442_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
This contrast is not part of the subject matter investigated here.  
37 C. Chitty, Education Policy in Britain (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 23. 
38 S. Fredman and G. Morris, ‘The Teachers’ Lesson: Collective Bargaining and the Courts’ (1987) 
Industrial Law Journal 215, 216. 
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As the years progressed, the parameters of duties became elastic, fitting in what 
the contemporary needs of students demanded.  
Much of 20th century English public sector education labour relations can be 
traced back to the Whitley Committee.39 Whitley vindicated collective bargaining 
as the foundation of industrial relations.40 The Burnham Committee applied 
Whitley to the education sector, specifically teachers and lecturers, in 1919. Lord 
Burnham limited himself to the determination of teachers’ pay and that decision 
shaped the area well into the late 20th century.41 After some initial resistance, 
Burnham precipitated a lengthy period (1929-1964) of labour relations stability in 
this public service. Determination of all teachers’ pay would be carried out 
through representations made by employer and employee at national joint 
councils;42 codified in the Education Act 1944, section 89. The Secretary of State 
for Education possessed the power to simply accept or reject the Committee 
recommendations. Agreements reached at the Committee level were to be 
accepted by the Local Authorities. 
The Remuneration of Teachers Act 1965 started a gradual movement away 
from collective bargaining.43 Slowly, public sector incomes were emerging as a 
concern requiring action:  
 
In one sense we can talk of a twenty year crisis between 1965 and 1985 during 
which time the Burnham variant of Whitley came under steady attack from 
various governments. There is no doubt that the trade unions and the vast 
majority of their members both favoured and benefited from the centralised 
national system of pay bargaining. The government was the greatest loser: the 
traditional cost-benefit analysis that government could control total wage 
costs through such central methods and avoid damaging national disputes 
eroded by both the strength of the union position and the weakness of the 
government’s economic hold on public expenditure.44 
 
The landmark Remuneration of Teachers Act placed the Department of 
Education and Science (DES) firmly within the Burnham framework and, more 
specifically, put it at the forefront of representation on the Management Panel. 
The jockeying of ministers to reconfigure Burnham into a cost certainty system 
                                                     
39 J. Whitley, Interim Report on Joint Standing Industrial Councils, Cm 8606 (London: HMSO, 1917). 
40 ‘Collective bargaining, for which organised labour has been fighting for over a century, was 
authoritatively pronounced normal and necessary, and was extended, potentially if not actually, over the 
whole field of wage-employment for the market’. H. Clay, The Problem of Industrial Relations (London: 
Macmillan, 1929), 177. 
41 There was no push up to the 1970s to expand the purview of these committees beyond remuneration: 
B.A. Hepple and P. O’Higgins, Public Employee Trade Unionism in the United Kingdom: The Legal Framework 
(Ann Arbor: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, The University of Michigan-Wayne State 
University, 1971), 123. 
42 Ironside and Seifert, n 2 above, 25. 
43 See Remuneration of Teachers Act 1965, c.3. 
44 Ironside and Seifert, n 2 above, 25. 
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(by controlling the outcomes of pay determination) starts here and, in essence but 
without the Burnham structure, continues today. The passage of the 
Remuneration of Teachers Act is one of the early stages of identifying the 
limitations of Burnham as it led to the national pay strike of 1969. The late 1960s 
evidenced ‘the system was unable to deal with either incomes policies or industrial 
action’.45 
Along with the prominence of the DES on the Management Panel, the vocal 
and powerful National Union of Teacher’s (NUT) loss of a majority on the 
Teachers’ Panel ‘allowed both the divisions among the teachers and the weakness 
among the employers to combine in rendering Burnham unworkable’.46 The 
contrast in prominence makes this an intriguing observation. The system worked 
while the NUT maintained its majority. Conversely, the state’s dominant 
involvement in collective negotiation contributed greatly to rendering Burnham 
unworkable. The story of Burnham’s demise and the concurrent ascendancy of 
government’s direct involvement foreshadows the present day. There is much 
which can be inferred, but a search for norms from the above observation is 
premature at this instance.47 It is sufficient to note the overarching result was that 
the collective negotiations system leading into the 1970s became unworkable.  
A new order developed with the 1965 reconstruction of the Burnham 
Committee which saw the Department of Education and Science come to the 
forefront of decision-making. A change to the relationship developed amongst the 
Board of Education, national associations of local authorities and the teachers’ 
association had been signalled.48 Two instructions were taken by teachers from 
this shift: 
 
First, as in 1961, that their traditional focus on the D.E.S. alone could give 
them no influence in the formulation of national economic policy that so 
directly affected them. Second, as throughout the confrontation, that even 
when bringing pressure to bear on the D.E.S. the deputations and 
memoranda of a divided teachers' lobby could not guarantee influence.49   
 
Between 1973 and 1975, public attention was focused on William Tyndale Junior 
School in North London. At the centre were the teaching methods of its staff 
which were alleged to have diminished the importance of reading, writing, and 
                                                     
45 ibid, 27. 
46 ibid. 
47 Ironside and Seifert, n 2 above, continued at 28: ‘The trade union side bargaining with the employers as 
one. This meant fierce bargaining within each union and between the unions and this again led to intense 
rivalries and strange alliances. The dominance of the NUT for most of the period of Burnham, however, 
meant that it was able to control the teachers’ panel more or less effectively when it mattered. This was 
not the case with the equally divided employers. They too had to bargain as one, and they too were often 
bitterly divided by political loyalties and regional antagonisms.’ 
48 D. Coates, ‘The Teachers' Associations and the Restructuring of Burnham’ (1972) 20 British Journal of 
Educational Studies 192, 201-202 [footnotes omitted]. 
49 ibid, 102. 
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arithmetic.50 A report concluded in 1976 that there were some teachers on staff 
who had grossly mismanaged the curriculum.51 In the immediate term, the scandal 
gave rise to considerable scrutiny of teaching methods. Long term, however, this 
incident assisted in grounding actions of the future governments of Margaret 
Thatcher, John Major, and Tony Blair to prescribe through legislation and other 
governmental tools what teachers shall do with students. The Tyndale scenario 
presented a compelling case for any politician to take aim at the work of the 
education system.  
Opinion (correctly or otherwise) had changed. Government was required to 
provide leadership in education. Assessing the public impact of the scandal, Chitty 
concluded: ‘the William Tyndale Affair was conclusive proof that enormous harm 
could be done by a group of “progressive” teachers in a state school when parents 
were kept out of school decision-making and when managers and inspectors were 
clearly guilty of failing to fulfil their statutory duties’.52 Newspapers wrote 
consistently during the late 1970s of a crisis in education – a failure of the system 
to sufficiently perform its work. Schools and teachers were blamed.53 Into the 
breach stepped the Margaret Thatcher-led Conservative Party – earning an 
election victory in 1979. By that time, the fear was that the failure of schools 
would seep into industry and disrupt the economy as well.54 
From 1919 to 1987, teacher pay was determined by the Burnham 
Commission, but for practical considerations the Burnham structure ended in 
1985. This system provided for employer and teacher representatives to bargain in 
a committee over pay. Local Education Authorities (LEAs) remained teachers’ 
employers. Of advantage to LEAs, this model eliminated competition amongst 
LEAs for teachers – which may cause a wage competition – as well as the 
possibility of pattern bargaining amongst the teacher unions, which would likely 
yield similar wage competition. After two years of labour unrest, the Labour-
dominated LEAs and the teacher unions reached a settlement regarding pay and 
conditions by working outside of the Burnham framework. The Thatcher 
Government refused to fund it. Instead it passed the Teachers’ Pay and 
Conditions Act 1987,55 which abolished collective bargaining arrangements and 
vested power in the Secretary of State to impose pay and conditions by Order: ‘the 
                                                     
50 Chitty, n 37 above, 37. 
51 ibid, citing Auld Report: R. Auld, William Tyndale Junior and Infants Schools Public Inquiry: A Report of the 
Inner London Education Authority by Robin Auld, QC (London: ILEA, 1976). 
52 Chitty, n 37 above, 38. 
53 ibid, 38: ‘with teachers unable or unwilling to uphold standards, and managers, governors and 
inspectors incapable of tackling the malaise’. 
54 ‘[Lord Young] argued, with the support of leading business people, that ‘schools were failing industry’ 
and, as Simon persuasively shows, ‘the strategy was now becoming clear – to shift the blame for what 
government policy had done to the schools onto the schools themselves – the teachers, administrators, 
even local government as a whole […].’ He could have added trade unions to this list. This triumph of 
the New Right in education was finally secured through the 1988 Act and the use of assessment for all 
children as requested by Rhodes Boyson and the Black Paper authors in 1975. Ironside and Seifert, n 2 
above, 22, citing B. Simon, Education and the Social Order (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991), 527. 
55 C.1. 
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legislation gives the Secretary of State virtually unrestricted powers to dictate 
teachers’ terms and conditions’.56 Teachers were mandated to work 195 days per 
year, 1265 hours and ‘shall [...] work such additional hours as may be needed to 
enable him to discharge effectively his professional duties [...]’.57 As was held in 
Sim v Rotherham B.C.,58 teachers would be in breach of contract if they refused to 
undertake these duties. Prescription moved from the more typical employer items 
such as working hours to the essence of what teachers do. The legacy of the 
Education Reform Act 1988 remains the National Curriculum which it 
contained:59 an itemisation of what teachers were to teach. LEAs remained 
employers of teachers, but only nominally for they had ‘very few if any powers 
over the employment relationship, yet retain[ed] most of the burdens of 
employer’.60 These two pieces of legislation embodied the government’s desire to 
prescribe teachers’ work, thereby diminishing any autonomy teachers previously 
enjoyed. The Thatcher Government had firmly taken control of the education 
portfolio – a bold move considering the scandal of the 1970s for one. It may have 
been a disguise – reclaiming education for the citizens – but the result appears to 
have been the one desired: with control centralised in the hands of the national 
government it could take the ‘dominant role’61 in the end product and also keep 
better control over costs in education, teachers’ pay being at the forefront of those 
concerns. Under the John Major-led Conservatives, in 1991 the School Teachers’ 
Pay Review Body (Pay Review Body)62 was established and subsequently 
maintained in the 2002 reforms made through the Education Act 2002. The Pay 
Review Body’s mandate was broad, but contingent. It must have considered any 
matter put before it by the Secretary of State which relates to: (1) ‘the 
remuneration of school teachers’,63 or (2) other conditions of employment of 
school teachers which relate to their professional duties or working time.64  
Labour relations unrest would seem to be an impoverished description, and 
yet, the decade during which Thatcher was in office has been regarded as a time of 
‘righting the ship’ – if we are to draw any inference from the lack of wholesale 
legislative change by the ‘New’ Labour governments at the turn of the century to 
the amendments Thatcher ushered in. It has been contended that the genesis for 
the Thatcher / Major reforms can be traced to a speech by Labour’s James 
                                                     
56 Fredman and Morris, n 13 above, 189. 
57 Kenneth Baker, H.C. Deb., Vol.111, col.589 (2 March 1987). 
58 [1986] I.R.L.R. 391. 
59 Education Reform Act 1988, c.40. 
60 ibid, 34. 
61 ‘This position […] hides a simpler truth which is that once education is treated as a traded commodity 
in a market then the purchasers of the product, the employers of labour, play an increasingly dominant 
role in the determination of the product itself.’ Ironside and Seifert, n 2 above, 22. 
62 School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Act 1991, s.1 (repealed). 
63 Education Act 2002 s.120(1)(a). 
64 ibid, s.120(1)(b). 
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Callaghan at Ruskin College, Oxford in 1976 which, in part, makes the following 
pronouncement:65 
 
I take it that no one claims exclusive rights in this field. Public interest is 
strong and legitimate and will be satisfied. We spend £6 billion a year on 
education. So there will be discussion […] parents, teachers, learned and 
professional bodies, representatives of higher education and both sides of 
industry, together with the Government, all have an important part to play in 
formulating and expressing the purpose of education and the standards that 
we need.66 
 
Callaghan’s extolling of the need for standards and accountability in this speech 
planted a seed which the Conservative Party cultivated and let grow into quite a 
harvest. The Labour leader also ventured some criticisms of teachers which he 
endeavoured to balance with an equal amount of praise. The point, though, clearly 
was that all involved in education were being called upon to improve their work 
and be held answerable for what they did. The idea that Callaghan started (even 
rhetorically) and Thatcher finished off bridges nicely to the Blair era,67 which, 
some now suggest, was nothing more than a continuation of the Conservatives’ 
education policy in substance. 
Moving ahead to the Blair era in English education, there was an abundance 
of hope with this change in government. From a general employment perspective, 
there has been much criticism of this period of time. There is substantial material 
here to be mined including the motivating ethos of the ‘New Labour’ government.   
The idea of a partnership between labour and management is one which has 
been at play in the United Kingdom most distinctly under the Blair Labour 
Government. His ‘Third Way’ sought to provide all individuals with equal 
opportunities. He also paid particular attention to the education portfolio by 
endeavouring to establish teaching as more of a profession.68 The Blair 
Government has faced its share of issues in regards to the management of 
education.69 Still, there has been the notion of greater cooperation while Blair was 
in office – perhaps not a unifying force, but certainly not the divisive presence 
which Thatcher was to teachers.  
                                                     
65 R. Phillips, ‘Education, the State and the Politics of Reform: The Historical Context, 1976-2001’ in R. 
Phillips and J. Furlong (eds), Education, Reform and the State: Twenty-Five Years of Politics, Policy and Practice 
(London: Routledge, 2001); G. McCulloch, ‘The Reinvention of Teacher Professionalism’ in Phillips and 
Furlong, ibid. 
66 J. Callaghan, ‘Towards a National Debate’ (16 October 1976), reprinted in The Guardian (15 October 
2001). 
67 Of more trivial interest, Blair refers to Callaghan’s urging a national curriculum in 1976 in his Foreword 
to Department for Education and Skills, Higher Standards, Better Schools for All: More Choice for Parents and 
Pupils, Cm 6677 (London: TSO, 2005), 1. 
68 A. Smithers, ‘Education’ in A. Seldon and D. Kavanagh (eds), The Blair Effect 2001-2005 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 266. 
69 As noted by Smithers throughout his article, ibid.  
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If the Thatcher era redefined the work of teachers, the Blair era continued 
that effort.70  Rather than accentuating their status as employees, Labour focused 
on outlining for teachers what it meant to be a professional. At the start, the new 
government was quite aggressive as noted in the agenda-setting White Paper 
Teachers: Meeting the Challenge of Change. Unlike the more antagonistic Thatcher era, 
however, the strategy employed during this period of time was to hospitably prod 
– though the prodding at times was not so cordial, especially early in the Blair 
mandate. In a discussion of the need to change teacher contracts, Meeting the 
Challenge of Change contained the following passage:  
 
The current pay and conditions arrangements for teachers suffer from 
significant problems. While in theory they allow for excellence to be 
recognised in salary terms, in practice good classroom performance is not 
sufficiently rewarded. The excellence points allowed for in the present 
scheme have been awarded to fewer than one per cent of all teachers. Instead, 
teachers move up a pay spine almost exclusively on the basis of time served, 
regardless of performance, up to a maximum of nine points which are worth 
£22,410 at December 1998 rates. Beyond that, progression depends in 
practice on taking on additional responsibility outside the classroom.71 
 
Disavowing a seniority model of reward, Labour established a new incentive-based 
teacher contract. It believed the seniority model was static and therefore inherently 
a disincentive for teachers to improve themselves. Professional lethargy then 
translated into a less effective education system. This syllogism cast doubt on the 
‘culture’ of educators as a whole:  
 
The main reason why the system has rewarded experience and responsibility 
but not performance is cultural. Heads and teachers have been more reluctant 
than comparable professional groups to distinguish the performance of some 
teachers from others, except through the award of responsibility points. The 
tradition, to which adherence remains powerful, is to treat all teachers as if 
their performance was similar, even though teachers themselves know that 
this is not the case. The effects have been to limit incentives for teachers to 
improve their performance and to make teaching much less attractive to 
talented and ambitious people than it should be. We are determined to create 
the conditions for this culture to change. We want to recognise and reward 
good performance and establish routes for real career progression. We want 
to reward teachers who are effective and whose pupils make good progress 
because of the motivation and inspiration they provide. We want to reward 
teachers who take on tough classes and deal with difficult children, and those 
who take the able to new heights. We recognise that many people working in 
                                                     
70 Whether the Third Way was liberal or neo-liberal is considered in A. Bogg, ‘New Labour, Trade 
Unions and the Liberal State’ (2009) 20 King’s Law Journal 403. 
71 Department for Education and Employment, n 3 above, 32. 
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schools make a substantial time commitment to carry out their professional 
duties. We want to reward teachers who contribute, with their expertise and 
their professional commitment, to raising standards of achievement and to 
the wider life of the school.72 
 
From a casual glance at this passage, one may think that teachers are being accused 
of collusion: shielding underperformers in a manner which curtails any motivation 
colleagues may have. Motivated teachers (the majority according to Meeting the 
Challenge of Change) are called upon to break free from this culture and, in 
recognition of this endeavour, they will be rewarded. The models for education 
governance continued the prescription initiated in the later 1980s and added 
performance management. What is most evident is that what was a prescribed 
form of management (mandating specific work to be done) became performance 
management. 
Supporting the idea that education reform started with Callaghan, elements of 
his influential 1976 speech are identifiable in the Blair years. In Teachers: Meeting the 
Challenge of Change the following call to new professionalism appeared:  
 
All this demands a new professionalism among teachers. The time has long 
gone when isolated, unaccountable professionals made curriculum and 
pedagogical decisions alone, without reference to the outside world. Teachers 
in a modern teaching profession need: 
• to have high expectations of themselves and of all pupils; 
• to accept accountability; 
• to take personal and collective responsibility for improving their skills 
and subject knowledge; 
• to seek to base decisions on evidence of what works in schools in this 
country and internationally; 
• to work in partnership with other staff in schools; 
• to welcome the contribution that parents, business and others outside 
a school can make to its success; and 
• to anticipate change and promote innovation.73 
 
The policy re-formed this cadre of workers and envisioned them as an active, 
engaged collective aimed at a common purpose but each ready to make their 
individual contributions. The common complaint of teachers had been a static pay 
structure. Just as Callaghan did in 1976, Teachers: Meeting the Challenge of Change also 
contained questions regarding teachers’ own static attitude:  
 
                                                     
72 ibid, 32-33. 
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Teachers too often seem to be afraid of change and therefore to resist it. 
Teachers have too often felt isolated. Many seem to believe they are unique 
victims of the process of constant change, although the reality is that in many 
other sectors change has been more revolutionary and had greater impact on 
pay, conditions and styles of work. 
 
Poorly managed change, conflict in the 1980s and early 1990s and uncertain 
funding for education over many years have also made their contribution to 
this state of affairs. Worst of all, there has been a widespread sense among 
many teachers and their leaders that nothing can be done to change it. The 
fatalistic view – which adds to the sense of despondency – seems to have 
been that it has to be this way.74 
 
Clearly, the Government (which carried the country’s aspirations for change) had 
identified a profound need for reform beyond curriculum. Performance legitimacy 
was the object of public education governance and yet the means of addressing 
the issue ran contrary to the role government had taken in other domestic affairs. 
If government was required to oversee matters, then it should do so in the least 
intrusive manner. This entailed government not being involved in ‘standard setting 
and enforcement of responsibilities.’75 In education, government was overtly 
intrusive.  
In contrast to the decentralisation efforts of ‘typical’ neoliberal governments, 
the Ontario Provincial Government of the mid-1990s to the turn of the 21st 
century centralised the management of the education system so that financing was 
determined by the Government and not by School Boards. The power to tax (raise 
the mill rate) was taken away from school boards. For the purposes of 
administrative efficiency, money came directly and only from the Ministry. The 
Government also assumed the responsibility for supervising school boards, 
making it illegal for a school board to run a deficit. The rationale for this 
assumption of financial responsibility by the Government had been closely linked 
with the Government’s election platform of significant income tax reduction for 
Ontarians.  
 
ONTARIO 
 
Ontario teachers have long been organised into associations, but did not gain the 
collective bargaining rights enjoyed by their English counterparts until 1975. For 
almost all of the first half of the twentieth century, teachers voluntarily joined one 
of the teacher associations. In 1944, the minority Progressive Conservative 
government (Conservative) passed the Teaching Profession Act.76 This was a 
remarkable event for its labour relations significance. The voluntary teacher 
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75 Smithers, n 68 above, 873. 
76 R.S.O. 1990, c.T.2. 
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organisations had been endeavouring to enact a provincial body. Representatives 
at the time believed they were not taken seriously by any government because 
voluntary membership meant that any one association did not speak for all 
teachers.77 A motivating concern among teacher representatives leading up to 
1944 centred on the two leading identities for teachers which remain a focus for 
debate today: ‘There was some concern in some areas [for example the 
government] that [if] teachers didn’t get the official Teaching Profession Act, they 
would certainly consider union membership’.78 For the government’s part, this 
seeming benevolence was in fact a product of political strategy. The Progressive 
Conservatives sought to shore up their support during their minority government 
term. Fearing that teachers would be swayed by the socialist Cooperative 
Commonwealth Federation,79 the government passed the Teaching Profession Act 
which rendered membership in the newly created Ontario Teachers’ Federation 
(OTF) mandatory. The existing teachers unions (five at the time, now four with 
the dissolution and merging of work between the men and women elementary 
teachers federations) formed the directorate of the Ontario Teachers’ Federation. 
Each union drew its membership from the Ontario Teachers’ Federation, in this 
union shop framework. To illustrate, a Catholic elementary school teacher would 
be assigned to the Catholic teachers union. Representation of Ontario’s teachers 
remains structured in this manner presently.  
Negotiations prior to and after 1944 were conducted in the nature of a 
‘gentleman’s agreement’. While the teachers’ unions were not officially teachers’ 
bargaining agents, it was accepted by school boards that contract negotiations 
regarding remuneration (this was the sole issue for some time until the teachers 
fought for bargaining over workplace issues) would be conducted with teachers’ 
union and not the individual teachers. Although distinct from events in England at 
the same time, the de facto arrangement fits within the framework established by 
the Teaching Profession Act. During this time, a scale was set for teachers’ 
salaries.80 Although teachers only gained the right to strike with the passage of 
legislation in 1975, an increasingly militant brand of teachers effectively utilised 
‘mass resignation’ as a viable alternative during the late 1960s into the 1970s. This 
strategy proved useful only because all teacher employment contracts contained 
                                                     
77 According to Helen Sheppard of the Federation of Women Teachers: ‘There wasn’t any 
communication [with the Provincial Government]. I think [the provincial government] denied us because 
I don’t think we have the numbers or force to go there and say this is what the teachers want. Every time 
we went, they would say how many do you represent? And we would say, 16% of the teachers. […] now 
we could speak, we could go to the government, we had a voice and they had to listen to us.’ History 
Project Meeting (Verbatim Minutes, 26 March 1986) (unpublished), 14. 
78 As outlined by Nora Hodgins, who in 1944 became the first Secretary-Treasurer (most senior 
executive, non-elected position) of the Ontario Teachers’ Federation. ibid, 29. 
79 ‘[T]he successful efforts of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) to attract teachers to its 
party and the possibility of teachers strikes’. S. Lawton, G. Bedard, D. MacLellan, and X. Li, Teachers’ 
Unions in Canada (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises Ltd, 1999), 26. 
80 The scales were different based on gender. Equal pay did not become a fertile issue until the mid-1980s 
with the passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
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one of two possible resignation dates. With all teachers resigning on one of those 
dates, school boards were left without staff for classrooms. The two-date system 
may have had administrative advantage; however, school boards quickly learned its 
labour relations implications. School boards still had the power to walk away from 
the table and unilaterally impose terms – though to do so would, as the years 
progressed, raise the ire of the ever more vocal teachers.  
From 1975 until 1996, teachers and school boards engaged in collective 
bargaining under the School Boards and Teachers’ Collective Negotiations Act.81 
The Act sought to resolve issues which had lingered for much of the 1970s. By the 
mid-1970s teachers’ militancy had crystallised, having established themselves as a 
formidable group for their employers. The Act responded to ardent opposition to 
the existing structure of negotiations. Teachers demanded the right to negotiate 
workplace issues while school boards remained equally adamant that nothing but 
remuneration should be discussed. The government had tried to remain separated 
from the issue for some time. With high levels of discord, it was forced not only 
to enter the fracas but to also seek a resolution which satisfied both employers and 
employees. Collective bargaining and sweet reason had not prevailed.82 The School 
Boards and Teachers’ Act established a more traditional labour relations 
framework within which the parties were to conduct themselves. It permitted 
negotiation of workplace items,83 a procedure for negotiations,84 voluntary binding 
arbitration,85 the right to strike,86 and the right to lock out.87 And so, government 
entered into this conflict to facilitate an improved structure for ongoing relations. 
This contrasts sharply with the Act’s repeal in the mid-1990s. Although there was 
debate throughout the two decades in which the School Boards and Teachers Act 
existed, there was no strong evidence of its failure to provide an amenable system 
for education labour relations.   
What had been completed in 1975 was removed in the mid-1990s during an 
unprecedented time of education reforms carrying serious labour relations 
implications. Then newly-elected, the Conservative government created a system 
of centralised control (approximately ten years after the Thatcher Conservatives 
did so in England), but one in which they were buffered from the immediate 
discontent expressed of their agenda: 
 
Instead, it has pursued a strategy based on centralized control over education, 
but no direct involvement in negotiations, leaving responsibility for 
bargaining in the hands of local school boards. Although the government 
sought to minimize its visibility and political accountability, the experience of 
                                                     
81 S.O. 1975, c.72, repealed by Education Quality Improvement Act 1997, c.31, s.178 [School Boards and 
Teachers’ Collective Negotiations Act]. 
82 Arthurs, n 10 above, 52. 
83 School Boards and Teachers’ Collective Negotiations Act, n 81 above, section 8. 
84 ibid, Part II, consisting of sections 9-12.   
85 ibid, section 29. 
86 ibid, section 63. 
87 ibid, section 69.  
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the last two bargaining rounds indicates this strategy has not been 
successful.88 
 
The government of the period may well be known for ‘creating a crisis’ in 
education. It raised public concern as to what was being done in Ontario schools 
calling for greater quality while simultaneously taking billions of dollars out of the 
system – some charged the removal of money was only to fulfill an election 
promise of across the board tax reductions. Regardless of the motivation, by 
centralising funding in the hands of the provincial government, public sector 
teacher unions were compelled to refocus their efforts on the Ontario 
Government instead of local school boards. In common parlance, they followed 
the money. At present, collective bargaining occurs with the individual school 
boards, but the significant workplace and remuneration issues are initially engaged 
with the government via a framework agreement. Just as in England, the 
government is now very much at the centre. Still in a state of change, 
developments in the latter part of 2008 suggest that the provincial agreement has 
embarked on proactive resolution of labour issues by inviting all the parties 
together to devise a framework agreement.89  
 
 
 
CHALLENGES IN PUBLIC SECTOR EDUCATION LABOUR 
RELATIONS 
 
Teaching remains a curious realm of work when analysed within a public / private 
dynamic. Although there has always been a healthy (though not dominant) 
independent school contingent of teachers, teaching is more accurately described 
as a lopsided employment arrangement in favour of the public sector. With the 
majority of teachers being hired by the government-funded system, teachers have 
not been in a strong position to ‘shop around’ for a better paying job. 
Government possesses the power to dictate an agenda within which teachers carry 
out their work. Teachers’ unions may bristle at this framework (if not the exercise 
of this power), and their efforts to change it may yield some modifications, but 
certainly will not halt the momentum of a government agenda.  
An underlying assumption respecting the exercise of its power is that 
government acts in the public interest. This idea contributes to a full discussion of 
the essence of public sector labour relations; most particularly the state’s role as 
neutral party within the industrial pluralist system. The work performed by public 
                                                     
88 J.B. Rose, ‘The Assault on School Teacher Bargaining in Ontario’ (2002) 57 Relations Industrielles 100, 
122. If nothing else, Ontario teacher unions did not exert the kind of influence which American legal 
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sector employees can be situated in differing notions of the public interest. In the 
State as Employer, the authors wrote of taxation in relation to industrial action:  
 
[…] the government derives the revenue to pay its employees primarily from 
taxation and not primarily from payments made by the public for services 
rendered by its employees. In effect, this allows governments when dealing 
with their employees to override commercial concerns in favour of political 
and macroeconomic factors. This has a particularly important impact on the 
role of industrial action in the public services. It is unusual for industrial 
action to have a substantial financial effect on government. Instead, trade 
unions rely on the political pressure which may result from the disruption in 
services to the public. However, governments may decide to ignore whatever 
political pressure is generated and withstand a strike if such a strategy is 
deemed to be politically desirable.90 
 
With a presumption of acting in the public interest, governments could be 
insulated from the traditional methods of collective action which may be used to 
pressure other employers to acquiesce.  
Since the 1970s, the focus for trade unions has evolved into greater concern 
for ‘the functioning of the labour market and the economy’.91 With this further 
factor, tolerance for public sector militancy (notably in the form of strikes) has 
waned. As the welfare state began to break down, the state’s willingness to 
continue with its large body of employees also diminished; having identified a 
need to ‘reduce budget deficits by limiting the size and costs of the public 
sector’.92 Consequently, public sector unions must refine their strategies and not 
simply rely on industrial action such as strikes. Pressure may be put on the 
government in other forms, such as public engagement on specific issues. Public 
sector unions’ pressure has primarily focused on government initiatives which 
were most often the subject of legislation. Legislation can engage the full range of 
items affecting its employees, from their working conditions to their 
remuneration.  
Government has held the decision-making power for public sector labour 
relations – a power which public sector unions have feared government (ab)use of 
this power as a means of ameliorating its position as employer.93 It can legislate 
workers back to their jobs as well as put forward legislation which limits union 
activities or set different parameters for the employment relationship. The 
framework of government provides legitimacy.94 The ideal of a legislature is that 
                                                     
90 Fredman and Morris, n 13 above, 7-8. 
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92 ibid, 47. 
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through fertile debate laws and policies are brought into existence. This formal 
process leads to a somewhat romanticised version of governance in which 
legislation is presumed to be made in the public interest. This is not necessarily the 
case. A majority government may usher through its policies and laws with little 
formal debate. This work may be in the public interest, but the frequent criticisms 
of laws highlights the term’s differing notions; that is, to what segment of the 
public does the legislation speak. This is not a debate about democracy. These 
comments are intended to underline that the public presumes key characteristics in 
government which it is not readily willing to identify in unions.  
To contrast, government has been often portrayed as representing the public 
interest while teachers’ unions have been classified as self-interested. The 
assertion’s premise remains an extrapolation of a truth. Certainly, public sector 
unions are self-interested insofar as the welfare of their members forms the 
primary concern. However, members’ interests can be situated within the public 
sector structure. It would take a weak government to give away without obtaining 
something in return, for example, a high salary with a reduction in workload 
during a round of negotiations. Although there are those who have claimed that 
public sector teachers’ unions cost taxpayers because their members are paid more 
than they should be,95 when broad factors (such as quality of those recruited and 
the ability to retain these individuals) are considered, it remains hard to be 
convinced about the accuracy of such claims.  
Government’s public functions contrast – some may say conflicts,96 – with its 
role as employer. The public sector collective agreement has stood out as ‘a 
product of government decision making’ because it ‘directly determines the terms 
and conditions that the government entity must provide, and it establishes the 
administrative structure and procedure to implement and enforce that government 
decision’.97 There has been a premium placed on the public interest. Three 
elements, identified in the literature, have comprised the public interest. First, 
government retains the obligation to work responsibly with tax money.98 Second, 
government services, provided through its employees, must be run in an effective 
manner. Finally, the insatiable public desire for lower taxes with more services,99 
continues to run contrary to a more practical labour relations point of view of 
paying a reasonable wage and providing good working conditions.100 This analysis 
of the public interest exalts the view that government acts in the public’s interest 
and, therefore, endeavours to mediate between the demands of public employees 
and the expectations of the voting public.  
                                                     
95 This remark is most often found in American literature such as: F.H. Hess and M.R. West, A Better 
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ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC SECTOR LABOUR RELATIONS 
 
Commentators have referred frequently to the prominence of politics in public 
sector labour relations.101 Though it may be an ‘obvious’ point, it is one which is 
underestimated.102 The prevalence of politics in education labour relations 
arguably has its origin as the dominant force it is today in the 1970s. That decade 
was a time of conflict between trade unionism and the pronounced economic 
issues of the day which precipitated such antagonistic policies as wage restraint.103 
This conflict gave rise to the greater presence of politics in industrial relations 
overall, and education can be pinpointed as one of the better examples of this 
clash. 
The political can bring ‘unwanted complexity’.104 ‘Rather than deriving an 
understanding of the political from a theory of the state, the concept of the state 
presupposes the concept of the political.’105 Political parties form governments, 
and the public accepts this substance in government. Indeed the very nature of 
public sector labour relations strikes at the heart of the political because any 
remuneration package provided by a collective agreement necessarily affects the 
public and incurs public scrutiny. It would seem plain that public sector unions 
especially should play a political role for its members: ‘[…]for any interest group it 
is essential to ensure that the legal and economic environment is hospitable to its 
goals and operations and that the views of its members are adequately represented 
in the political process by lobbying and other means’.106 Public opinion constitutes 
an essential barometer for government initiatives: ‘With the results of public sector 
bargaining frequently affecting the general public more than the parties to the 
dispute, public opinion must be an important factor in determining bargaining 
tactics.’107  
Politics is a multi-faceted term. In public sector labour relations, government 
decision-making is political, but the factors considered within that term extend 
beyond economics.108 What is meant by ‘politics’? Loughlin provides an important 
dissection of the term. The modern state endures tension between autonomy and 
                                                     
101 See for example, Summers, ‘Public Employee Bargaining’, n 9 above. Richard Freeman calls the ability 
of public sector unions to influence government through the political process a ‘fundamental difference’ 
between public and private sector unions. R. Freeman, ‘Unionism Comes to the Public Sector’ (1986) 24 
Journal of Economic Literature 41, 42, 52.  
102 R. Clark Jr, ‘Politics and Public Employee Unionism: Some Recommendations for an Emerging 
Problem’ (1975) 44 University of Cincinnati Law Review 680, 680, writes: ‘Unlike the private sector, where 
collective bargaining takes place in an environment in which market forces largely predominate, collective 
bargaining in the public sector must take place in a political environment. Despite this obvious fact, too 
little attention has been paid to the political aspects of public sector collective bargaining and the 
potential problems and distortions of the political process that will result if remedies are not instituted.’ 
Clark focuses exclusively on what he sees as the disproportionate influence which public sector unions 
wield. The point, however, may be more extensively applicable to both government and unions. 
103 Bruun and Hepple, n 91 above, 45. 
104 Makinson, n 24 above, 5. 
105 M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 32. 
106 S. Deakin and G. S. Morris Labour Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 4th ed, 2009), 731. 
107 Goldenberg, n 96 above, 13.  
108 Wellington and Winter, n 9 above, 1116. 
               21/2010 
 
 22 
collectivism. It is within attempts to find a balance between these that politics is 
situated:  
 
Politics emerges as a product of contests for authority in government; it arises 
only when the composition and conduct of governmental authority is 
debated, criticized, and determined. Politics is a consequence of the 
recognition that the arrangements of government are the result of human 
choice.109 
 
Given this power, the decision-making process of government is the content of 
politics. Within politics, there is arguably an element of best intentions where 
choices are made ‘between rival goods in circumstances where there can be no 
authoritative yardstick for resolving differences’.110 Weber writes of politics: ‘we 
will understand it as the leadership, or the influencing of the leadership, of a 
political group body, or [...] state’.111 Not as evident in literature on public sector 
labour relations, influences on government decision-making are often a 
surreptitious factor. Citizens accept the idea that this occurs, but the details or 
extent of the influence is too often hard to pinpoint. Nonetheless, these influences 
and how they are expressed play a formative role in governance.  
These influences fall under a broad premise which informs this analysis: 
‘Politicians are in the business of politics.’112 This means that political parties are 
looking to form the government. This process is ongoing as a sitting government 
will seek to demonstrate skilful handling of its various portfolios as a means of 
reinforcing their place in power. Since political parties are in the business of being 
elected to govern,113 their platforms are developed so as to maximise the votes 
cast in their favour. To achieve this aim, politicians will galvanise voters by 
identifying and pressing issues which are valued by one group over another. A 
political party will not likely use a platform of one issue, but a combination of 
‘values’. The aspiration is to gather sufficient support from both the interplay of 
issues as well as specific points of interest for voters. Around the turn of the 21st 
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century, campaigns have focused on tax reduction and strict management of 
public services, thereby playing on public aversion to paying tax at all.   
Education (and particularly teachers) has been a subject which political parties 
can exploit for political gain. A host of stereotypes (for example teachers being 
‘lazy’) can be utilised. Teachers do not hold a position of vast respect such as a 
doctor for technical knowledge or years of training (a reason why education can be 
a more vulnerable topic than health). There is no accepted method of teaching – 
especially with immense cultural diversity and learning needs amongst students. 
The system is one of the largest expenditures for any government (along with 
health). A large percentage of any electorate has children, but, more importantly, 
there is not a general consensus as to how to effect an improved education system 
for the ‘globalised world’.  
Not entirely an admirable situation, centralised control can give rise to an 
‘intolerable’ situation in education: ‘Local government administrators are helplessly 
caught between employee compensation demands, public unwillingness to vote 
for increased operating millage levied on property, and the state legislature’s 
reluctance to allow local governments the freedom to impose income, sales, or 
excise taxes.’114 The flaw in this framework is that maintaining such a scenario 
where local governments (here school boards) do not possess the ‘authority 
commensurate with their bargaining responsibilities is hardly likely to be in the 
public interest’.115 Central government is buffered from some of its less popular 
decisions by this extra ‘layer’ of governance. As they are in tort law,116 so too are 
local education authorities left open to fervent criticism leading to litigious 
positions.   
The position of teachers’ unions in relation to government in a centralised 
management framework remains to be situated within the framework laid out 
above. Government has an advantage in its role as both employer and legislator. 
Public sector unions, conversely, carry the responsibility of effective 
representation of their members. When these two mandates conflict (as local 
authorities appear to be squeezed out of the picture), it is the prerogative of the 
democratically elected government which will trump. One example had been 
played out in early 1960s England when the Government, concerned with public 
spending, injected itself into the Burnham Committee. When Government’s will 
was still not satisfied, it vetoed pay settlements arrived at by the Committee. 
American legal scholars have paid particular attention to the tensions which, 
they believe, pull at government when engaged in negotiation with its employees. 
Wellington and Winter suggest that government is caught between the demands of 
the public, who are voters, and those of public sector employees. Both aspects 
combine to exert enormous pressure on government.117 Within the discussions in 
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the literature on the role of government, the underlying premise has been 
government stands for the best interests of the people. Characterisations of 
unions, conversely, include how collective bargaining provides them with the 
unfettered opportunity to corner politicians; giving unions’ voices ‘added 
effectiveness’.118 One example of this type of attitude is as follows:119 
 
My thesis is that the extension of broad collective bargaining rights to public 
employees when coupled with the ability of public sector unions to 
participate actively in the election of the officials with whom they negotiate at 
the bargaining table gives public sector unions a disproportionate amount of 
power which will distort the political process. In this regard, public sector 
unions which wield both political and collective bargaining power in their 
dealings with employers are akin to the factions discussed by James Madison 
in The Federalist No. 10: ‘By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, 
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united 
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to 
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community.’120 
 
Public sector unions are ‘factions’ whose effects legislation must control.121 They 
are antagonistic and act in defiance of the public interest.122 The influence which 
these unions have creates imbalance.123  
According to these authors, unions represent the best case for regulation 
because unions possess an unfair advantage. The following quotation 
demonstrates this with reference to public sector education:  
 
The board will be confronted directly by the union’s demands with no 
equivalent articulate counter-pressure from other interested groups. Once the 
agreement has been made at the bargaining table, it is difficult to block it at 
the ratification stage unless it has substantial impact on the budget. This gives 
the union, as the representative of the teachers, a larger and more effective 
voice in the decision than if there was no collective bargaining. It largely 
precludes the voters from having an effective voice. The effect of collective 
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bargaining is to significantly change the political process, removing subjects 
of bargaining from effective public discussion.124  
 
Coupled with these ideas regarding collective negotiations, it has also been 
suggested (and one may editorialise that it is rather easy to contend this, but harder 
to render this a general principle of teacher union representation) unions do not 
speak for all members.125 Theories which view unions as having a distinct 
advantage do not contemplate a union settling for anything less than what is 
demanded.126 It is no secret that financial issues have long posed a limitation on 
union demands in the public sector. Financial realities (even perceived) form 
ready-made counter-arguments to union demands. Indeed, these realities can only 
embolden politicians as they stand fast against union demands. These ideas are 
equivocal regarding the exaggerated notions of unfettered union power, detectable 
in these critical views.127 
Government is both decision-maker which is politically accountable and 
political party which is also seeking to maximise its own electoral capital with these 
decisions.128 Voters, who ultimately pay for wage increases, exhibit distemper 
towards tax increases. In turn, tax payers demand more services while maintaining 
the same rates of public employee pay. Since taxpayers outnumber public 
employees, the parameters of collective bargaining need to protect employees in 
order to ‘counteract the overriding political strength of other voters who 
constantly press for lower taxes and increased services.’129 Put in terms of 
employee remuneration, public sector workers should not be subsidising the 
services they provide. A disproportionate pay system may also be required in order 
to address entrenched social concerns.130 The difficulty remains in achieving a 
balance which ‘provides effective and fair procedures to the disputants, supplies 
an effective set of dispute resolution interventions to assist them, protects the 
public interest, and is relatively low-cost.’131 
It is perhaps the ideas Loughlin proffers which reveal why unions are branded 
a negative influence. Referring to Tawney’s work, Loughlin writes: ‘Rights, he 
suggests, express a principle of division and enable individuals to resist, whereas 
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duties are a principle of union that lead individuals to cooperate.’132 If unions 
protect employees’ rights, then unions are imposing hindrances to the execution of 
management of duties. Seeking to enforce rights provides a means of resistance 
where resistance is viewed as entirely counter-productive and not in the public 
interest. Thatcher’s charging of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 1988 
with uncovering ‘restrictive labour practices’133 in TV and filmmaking provides an 
enlightening example.134 The mandate of the Commission was to detect the 
following:  
 
(a) the practice of restricting the extent to which work is performed by 
workers who are not members of a particular trade union; 
(b) the practice of requiring that minimum numbers of workers (whether or 
not of specified descriptions) be engaged on particular productions or tasks.  
 
In establishing the background to the report, the Commission provides prescient 
comments: 
 
It is probable that the general perception of restrictive labour practices, as 
that term is commonly used, is that they stem from poor management, the 
misuse of union power or the power of a workforce able to act collectively. 
They may be attributed to the workforce unilaterally, to the workforce and 
management reaching collective agreements, or to management simply 
permitting the practices to evolve, perhaps as a trade-off on other issues. 
There are also general perceptions about the prevalence of such restrictive 
practices.135 
 
The perception of the negative influence of unions and the constricting 
consequences embodied in collective agreements was at the forefront of this 
comment.136 In 1988 the massive and controversial Education Reform Act 1988 
was also introduced. The section 79 reference further evidences anti-union animus 
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on behalf of the government of the day. The failure to uncover the skeletons in 
the union closet details more than a ‘propaganda victory’ for labour and TV 
companies,137 because once the Commission had been charged with its task, two 
major networks started to abolish restrictive practices.138 Although a reform 
process may have been underway at the time,139 it remains hard to ignore the 
timing of the voluntary overhaul. The Commission believed that the calling of the 
Commission instigated change: ‘Fundamental changes are taking place in the 
industry at present both in general and in its employment and working practices 
[…] These changes in employment and working practices were very evident during 
the course of our inquiry, so much so that we were conscious, as it was put to us, 
that we were “shooting at a moving target”.’140 
Evidence for both sides of the argument exist in the above example – and it 
may be noted that each has its own preconceptions about the other. It was this 
type of scenario – where a member of the public cannot clearly identify a winner 
or loser – that provided the leeway for individual biases to make determinative 
judgments. The animus against unions centred on their role as impediments to 
competition and efficiency. The rallying call of unions is the unfair treatment of 
unfettered, profit-driven interests. Ironically, the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission in 1988 brought both of these attitudes out in the open. 
Aside from branding a public sector collective as a form of impediment to 
efficiency, Summers’ contention that civil servants are in a vulnerable position 
because they are paid via taxes alludes to an idea of subjugation. Bundled within 
this concept is a sense of entitlement on the part of the public when it comes to 
civil servants. The presumption is premised on the idea that an individual pays for 
a service and so can demand a certain type of outcome. Taxpayers believe in 
prescribed entitlements for their money; though they are not necessarily aware of 
the full extent of the service provision costs. The adamant belief of these paying 
individuals has an impact. Politicians seek to address these concerns by relying on 
a form of subjugation of those civil service employees.  
Civil servants have been hard-pressed to cultivate public support when they 
campaign for ‘fair pay’ or ‘better work conditions’.141 An astute government can 
take advantage of an expandable public attitude to squeeze more from a civil 
service union so long as it is framed as a matter of fiscal responsibility where this 
term is used as a response to pay rise campaigns for public workers. This is not to 
say that the public would permit outright abuse of civil servants, but rather that it 
is an elastic boundary rather than a firm border. Put within the political 
framework, hostility towards government can be exceeded by a general disregard 
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for civil servants’ best interests,142 for, as Sniderman et al note, the turning point 
for tolerance of others’ interests occurs when those interests negatively impact on 
our own.143 And so, there has been a deepening of the distinction between the 
public and private sectors. State adoption of reflexive labour law – a theory which 
has developed within the vacuum of labour law theory – as a modern means of 
interaction with the private sector has been poorly received in public sector labour 
relations. The self-regulatory, enlightened notions,144 which are meant to 
accompany reflexive labour law are absolutely cast aside where government is the 
employer in favour of prescriptive micro-management. As a result it may be 
wondered whether government has taken up the identity Kahn-Freund suggested: 
‘a social ideal of socialism’ or the ‘subordination of collective conflict and 
autonomy to the will of the state’.145 The distrust of teachers has become an 
unofficial policy. Teachers stand not as professionals, but in the much more 
subordinated position of employees who must be directed with precise detail. 
An updated version of the outline of public sector education labour relations 
may be stated. As a means of creating leverage, teachers’ unions have taken to 
campaigning to draw public support for their members. These efforts have been 
met by government with a counteracting campaign. In the middle the public sits. 
There is an intriguing and unwitting fit here. There has been a crescendo of 
politicisation since the late 1960s (the age of quite significant teachers’ unions 
activities) and it has reached its present point. The public wants to be consulted 
but on issues of structure,146 and not, it seems, the details of programming. Public 
services must fit around the public’s lives.147 With both unions and government 
providing information on certain topics to the public, the current system of labour 
relations appears bespoke for the electorate. While the parties determine the 
topics, public opinion has been actively sought. Though a passive format as it 
situates the public in the role of casual observer,148 this system nonetheless 
compels the public to be involved. The engagement point, as Sniderman et al 
note,149 will be how the plan affects the individual: good plans cease to be so when 
they are viewed as infringing on the individual. Without being cynical, there is a 
perception of influence enjoyed by the public, for the potency of messaging and 
public relations cannot be underestimated in their ability to shape the public’s 
opinion. With a centralised system, the local framework has atrophied, and yet a 
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desire for local engagement remains. In the following sections, the implications of 
this framework are considered.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The respective eras under study stands out as one of transformation in public 
sector labour relations within both jurisdictions. These significant changes are 
consistent with those found more broadly in employment such as increasing 
limitations on the employment relationship; greater supra-national influence on 
national / provincial policy; and a decline in the use of collective action. Today the 
state is not a model employer; that is, a positive model for how to treat 
employees.150  
Events in both England and Canada suggest intriguing parallels. There is an 
evolution of engagement with education management which starts with what we 
may call a laissez-faire attitude where teachers are given parameters within which to 
work, but the execution remains the decision of the individual teacher. A change 
occurs where there is some impetus to question the trust vested in individual 
teachers. For England, the crystallising event was the William Tyndale scandal, but 
the movement had already been initiated in the 1960s with government’s direct 
involvement with the Burnham Committee due to its concern over public 
expenditure. For Ontario, there was no motivating scandal. Rather, in the 
infamous words of a Minister of Education, a crisis was created by the 
government. While the precipitating factor is different, the political advantage 
returns the symmetry between the two examples: after each incident a 
Conservative party had entered into office. In each jurisdiction, the Conservative 
era was one of conflict with teachers’ unions and increased prescription of work. 
Following this period, a new, liberal party was elected; with a desire for less 
conflict. It would seem the conservative eras precipitated a wholesale, yet 
inevitable, change in attitude, after years of conflict.   
Looking ahead, there are some points to monitor. From the perspective of a 
new public sector education relations framework for the 21st century, a certain 
amount of apprehension is detectable, and it has resulted in some assumptions; 
whether or not these assumptions have led to good decisions is another matter. 
One assumption was that centralisation of control over education is a good 
decision. It provided for consistency over the breadth of the jurisdiction in areas 
such as curriculum, student expectations, duties of teachers, and the demands of 
Local Education Authorities. The hypothesis may also be scrutinised in many 
ways. Indeed, the Coalition Government’s plans of academies and free schools 
clearly demonstrate an effort to relinquish strict central control. Education has 
been placed in the most political of environments. Limitation (if not removal) of 
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local control is a step away from making education a matter of individual 
communities. However, it would appear – through such mechanisms as increased, 
even encouraged, parental involvement – these local concerns will continue to 
have a voice, but will not necessarily be resolved as local governance is limited in 
what it can do. Absence of an avenue for giving effect to local voice reveals why 
this move towards centralisation had value to the government at the time it 
occurred. In each instance a strategic purpose was served for the political party in 
power to make this decisive move. Both Conservative parties desired to be seen as 
active managers, and taking control was the definitive move. For that point in 
time, the decision was sound, if one limited the analysis to the inherent political 
value. However, as an on-going task of government it may not be a sound decision 
for such wholesale centralisation. 
When each liberal government took over control from its conservative 
predecessor, the acerbic relationship between government and its teachers stood 
out as a key problem which had been inherited. Therefore, it did not matter much 
that centralisation had in effect said to teachers ‘we do not trust your work’. It 
remained consistent with the language of conflict. As we move along with a more 
prescriptive agenda, is this initial distrust not engrained to the point that it has 
become policy? In England, labour has placed significant emphasis on leadership 
in schools, and this would suggest some form of trust. This is trust in the 
hierarchy of responsibility. Education transcends the ‘chain of command’ formula, 
and this is most pertinent when considering assessment. With the paradigm of 
‘performativity’, a desire exists to measure performance (‘whether of the individual 
pupil or of the institution as a whole’).151 The data required is the work product of 
the individual teacher. If policy continues to casually allude to a distrust of 
teachers’ work, then it renders equivocal what confidence can be placed in any 
test.  
Finally, these assumptions (centralisation of control and testing as a means of 
confronting distrust) pose recurring questions as education reforms continue to 
impinge on teachers’ workplace role. There is no evidence that centralised control 
of education provides better results. Furthermore, it remains unknown whether 
greater testing and prescription of work (which borders on ‘foolproofing’) results 
in smarter students. Both are ideas which have become operating guidelines for 
the management of public sector education. It is clear why these were selected – 
they made good political sense: the ensuing actions (premised on the assumptions) 
demonstrated that the government was actively engaged in this portfolio and had 
put in place ‘proper safeguards’ to ensure its effective functioning. These actions, 
however, were at arm’s length: they directed but did not equip. The whole system 
relied on good teachers who remained in the profession for their careers. Where 
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the workplace was a political hotbed and scrutiny was consistent, the idea of good 
teachers remaining in the profession may be a tough proposition.  
To provide a final measure of how far things have moved, consider the 
following. In a study of English public employee unionism up to the early 1970s, 
Hepple and O’Higgins wrote of support between employer and employees. They 
concluded: ‘Stability has been maintained through the willingness of both sides to 
work the system.’152 While accurate to the authors’ analysis, this same statement 
provides a measure of the current status of public sector education labour 
relations. The following reconstruction of this phrase reflects contemporary 
circumstances: the willingness of both parties to work the system poses a potential 
threat to the stability of labour relations. The meaning of ‘working the system’ has 
evolved into a competition of public relations strategies. With the public sitting in 
the middle, the battle of public relations strategies (itself a comment on the 
limitations of law as embodying the framework) signifies how far the system has 
been worked and how each party has ‘worked it’.  
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